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The concept of self-representation is commonly decomposed into three component
constructs (sense of embodiment, sense of agency, and sense of presence), and each
is typically investigated separately across different experimental contexts. For example,
embodiment has been explored in bodily illusions; agency has been investigated
in hypnosis research; and presence has been primarily studied in the context of
Virtual Reality (VR) technology. Given that each component involves the integration of
multiple cues within and across sensory modalities, they may rely on similar underlying
mechanisms. However, the degree to which this may be true remains unclear when they
are independently studied. As a first step toward addressing this issue, we manipulated
a range of cues relevant to these components of self-representation within a single
experimental context. Using consumer-grade Oculus Rift VR technology, and a new
implementation of the Virtual Hand Illusion, we systematically manipulated visual form
plausibility, visual–tactile synchrony, and visual–proprioceptive spatial offset to explore
their influence on self-representation. Our results show that these cues differentially
influence embodiment, agency, and presence. We provide evidence that each type of
cue can independently and non-hierarchically influence self-representation yet none of
these cues strictly constrains or gates the influence of the others. We discuss theoretical
implications for understanding self-representation as well as practical implications for VR
experiment design, including the suitability of consumer-based VR technology in research
settings.
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INTRODUCTION
Researchers have long puzzled over how best to describe and study the way we experience
and represent ourselves. To gain traction on this problem, a common strategy is to decompose
the concept of self-representation into several distinct components. These include: sense of
embodiment—the experience of owning a body and knowing its location (Longo et al., 2008b);
sense of agency—the experience of causing actions and events in the world (Wegner, 2004);
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and sense of presence—the experience of “being there,” of being
situated in an environment (Sanchez-Vives and Slater, 2005).
These components of self-representation have typically been
studied independently in a variety of different experimental
contexts. For example, embodiment has been investigated using
bodily illusions (Botvinick and Cohen, 1998; Longo et al.,
2008b; Tsakiris, 2010; Blanke, 2012; Ehrsson, 2012; Blanke et al.,
2015); agency has been manipulated using hypnosis techniques
(Kihlstrom, 2008; Polito et al., 2014) and in clinical research
(Frith and Done, 1989); and presence has been investigated in the
context of Virtual Reality (VR) and communication technologies
such as videoconferencing (e.g., Ijsselsteijn et al., 2001; Sanchez-
Vives and Slater, 2005).
Embodiment Cues
One way to understand these components of self-representation
(embodiment, agency, presence) is to explore how they are
induced and modified by different sensory cues. For example,
research into embodiment has largely focused on the rubber
hand illusion (RHI, Botvinick and Cohen, 1998). This paradigm
allows researchers to introduce conflicts between multisensory
cues and thus to investigate the effect of different cues on self-
representation. In the conventional RHI paradigm, an artificial
hand is placed next to a participant’s hidden hand. When
both hands are stroked at the same time, this can induce an
experience of embodiment such that the participant feels that
the artificial hand is part of their own body. Researchers have
manipulated cues such as the synchrony of tactile and visual
stimulation or the form of the artificial hand to investigate
which signals are important drivers of the sense of embodiment.
Embodiment in this paradigm is typically measured by asking
participants to report their subjective experience related to body
ownership, agency, and the perceived location of their limb
(Tsakiris and Haggard, 2005; Longo et al., 2008b), or with action-
orientedmeasures that involve decisions, actions or physiological
reactions to stimuli near the body (Armel and Ramachandran,
2003; Aspell et al., 2009; Zopf et al., 2010, 2011, 2013).
Agency Cues
Although agency has sometimes been considered an element
of embodiment, there has also been considerable research
investigating the sense of agency as an independent construct,
using a variety of experimental designs. In some of these designs,
specific experimental cue manipulations changed the kind of
cognitive attributions or sensory predictions participants made
about their own or others’ actions. For example, in Wegner
and Wheatley’s (1999) “I-Spy” task, false audio commentaries
describing themotion of a mouse cursor displayed on a computer
screen led participants to misattribute their own thoughts as the
cause of the actions they observed, even though these actions
were actually externally generated. Conversely, in the Blakemore
et al. (2000) study of tickle responses, a mechanical device
was used to introduce a temporal delay between participants’
tickling actions and the tactile stimulus from those actions. This
manipulation interfered with participants’ sensory predictions
regarding the outcome of their intended actions and led them
to experience these self-generated movements as if they had
been externally generated. In another line of research, hypnotic
suggestions have been shown to induce significant changes in the
way that susceptible participants generate and monitor actions,
leading to marked alterations to the sense of agency (Polito
et al., 2014). Sense of agency has been measured in a variety
of ways including explicit ratings of first-person experience
(Bowers, 1981; Polito et al., 2014, 2015) and indirect, implicit
measures such as intentional binding, which uses participants’
time judgments regarding causal actions in a behavioral task as
a proxy for agency (Haggard et al., 2002).
Presence Cues
Research into cues that influence the sense of presence has
typically taken two forms. First, some studies have investigated
how the experience of being present in a virtual environment is
affected by the technical capacity of the VR hardware to deliver
realistic multisensory cues. These studies include the impact
on presence of: head tracking and provision of stereoscopic
3D cues (Hendrix and Barfield, 1995; Barfield et al., 1999);
VR display resolution and refresh rate (Barfield and Hendrix,
1995); latency between headmovement and VR display updating,
and the inclusion of haptic feedback (Sanchez-Vives and Slater,
2005). Such studies of presence are also clearly important for the
consumer VR industry. For example, the Oculus Best Practices
(Oculus, 2016) emphasizes the importance of achieving <20ms
latency between head movements and corresponding screen
updates, in addition to maximizing screen refresh rate, to avoid
negative impacts on user comfort and presence.
The second area of presence research aims to identify the
specific cues and content within virtual environments that lead
to increased presence. For example, Slater et al. (2009a) and Yu
et al. (2012) investigated the extent to which visual realism of the
virtual environment affects presence. Their work concluded that
it was the dynamic nature of shadows and reflections in response
to events rather than mere lighting and reflection quality that
primarily drives a sense of presence (Yu et al., 2012).
Post-experiment subjective questionnaires with explicit rating
scales are a primary tool for measuring presence. Some
researchers, however, have sought to measure presence more
objectively by employing implicit behavioral and physiological
reactions such as measuring changes in heart rate (Sanchez-Vives
and Slater, 2005).
Investigating Self-Representation Using
the Virtual Hand Illusion
These separate lines of research into embodiment, agency,
and presence have found that each component involves the
integration of multiple cues both within and across sensory
modalities. This suggests that these components may partly
rely on similar underlying mechanisms. However, the degree
to which this may be true remains unclear. Some authors, for
example, have suggested that components such as ownership
and agency may directly influence each other (Tsakiris et al.,
2006; Morgan, 2015). Alternatively, these components may
simply rely on similar cues (Synofzik et al., 2008; Zhang et al.,
2014). As a step toward addressing this issue, in this study
we systematically manipulated a range of cues and studied
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their effect on the different components of self within a single
experimental context. The context we chose is a variant of the
RHI paradigm. Specifically, we implemented a new VR version
of this paradigm—the Virtual Hand Illusion (VHI, Slater et al.,
2008).
RHI-type paradigms commonly involve manipulations of
various cues across the modalities of vision, touch, and
proprioception. The experience of embodiment in the RHI
results from the integration of multiple sensory cues that could
plausibly provide body relevant information (Tsakiris, 2010;
Apps and Tsakiris, 2014; Blanke et al., 2015; Kilteni et al., 2015).
Three key cues that have been found tomodulate embodiment
in the RHI are: (a) visual-form plausibility (hereafter FORM),
how realistically the experimental stimulus resembles a body
(Tsakiris and Haggard, 2005; Tsakiris et al., 2010); (b) visual–
tactile synchrony (hereafter TOUCH), the consistency in timing
between tactile stimulation applied to a participant’s own hand
and the visual representation of stimulation applied to the rubber
hand (Botvinick and Cohen, 1998); and (c) visual–proprioceptive
spatial position offset (hereafter OFFSET), the distance between
the proprioceptively localized real hand and the visually localized
rubber hand. A number of researchers (e.g., Tsakiris, 2010; Blanke
et al., 2015) have claimed that introducing discrepancies to these
cues can constrain the inclusion of the artificial hand as a part of
bodily self-representation.
However, three findings in the literature indicate that
introducing discrepancies to these cues may not always act as
hard limits on embodiment. First, placing the artificial hand far
from the actual hand (i.e., introducing a large spatial OFFSET
between vision and proprioception) does not always affect the
RHI, especially when the viewed hand is placed near the trunk
(Zopf et al., 2010; Preston, 2013). Second, in a recent VHI
study where participants were able to move the virtual limb,
embodiment effects were found even when the visual form of
the target stimulus was a balloon or square rather than a virtual
hand (Ma and Hommel, 2015). It is, however, unclear if this is
also the case in a passive version of the illusion. Third, previous
data suggest that TOUCH might have its strongest effect when
there is a spatial offset between the hands (Zopf et al., 2010).
To the best of our knowledge, no previous study has
systematically manipulated all three cues (FORM, TOUCH, and
OFFSET) within a single experimental context. For each cue,
these manipulations involve altering the degree of alignment
between the presented visual feedback and other sources of
information regarding the body. For example, the effect of
FORM can be tested by comparing a condition where the
virtual hand form is congruent with that of the real hand,
vs. a condition where the virtual form is not at all hand-like,
such as presenting a simple block or sphere. Similarly, the
effect of TOUCH can be tested by altering the synchronization
between seen and felt touch stimuli. Finally, the effect of
OFFSET can be tested by introducing a discrepancy between
the visually presented and felt real hand position. Exploring
each of these cues within a single experimental context permits
examination of main effects and interactions, both of which are
critically important for determining the relative importance of
the individual cues.
In this study, we simultaneously manipulated FORM,
TOUCH, andOFFSET to investigate their effects and interactions
on embodiment as well as other aspects of self-representation
such as the sense of agency and presence in an RHI-type
paradigm. For FORM and OFFSET we used two conditions
each, a congruent and an incongruent condition. For TOUCH,
in addition to the commonly employed synchronous and
asynchronous conditions, we also included a “no-touch” control
condition in which no active tactile stimulation is delivered,
(passive touch still occurs via the hand resting on the table).
Little is known about how the mere occurrence of a touch might
influence embodiment, since only a few previous studies have
employed a no-touch condition (Longo et al., 2008a; Rohde et al.,
2011).
Rationale for Using the Virtual Hand
Illusion
In this study, we employed a VHI paradigm, which is an
adaptation of the RHI to a virtual environment (Slater et al.,
2008). The VHI paradigm offers several methodological
advantages compared to the standard RHI. Computer
simulations allow a high level of experimental control, continuity
and precise repeatability for stimulus presentation. Using a
virtual hand makes it easy to carefully manipulate many aspects
of visual form, for example, changing hand shape while keeping
skin texture constant. Also, the contextual break that results
from placing a fake hand model in a real world context can
be avoided by using VR to seamlessly present a virtual hand
model in a similarly virtual environment. Furthermore, the VHI
setup allows for consistent matching between the presentation
times of tactile and visual stimuli, providing a greater level of
temporal reliability compared to the experimenter-generated
manual brushing commonly employed in the RHI. Finally, the
presentation of visual stimuli is not restricted due to physical
interference from the artificial limb. Instead, stimuli can be
presented anywhere within the virtual environment making
it much easier to achieve true overlap (no apparent spatial
OFFSET) between virtual and actual body parts.
A former disadvantage of the VHI compared to the RHI
has been the challenge, time and cost of creating virtual
environments and acquiring VR equipment. Until very recently,
VR technology was limited to specialty research and niche
training applications such as flight simulator training or other
military applications, but this is no longer true. Affordable,
high quality VR head-mounted displays (HMDs) such as the
Oculus Rift are now commercially available. The confluence of
consumer VR with the mainstreaming of video-game and other
computer-generated video media also means that powerful and
easy-to-use desktop 3D environment creation software is now
readily available, supported by online marketplaces with large
user communities of enthusiasts, graphic artists, and developers.
Consequently, researchers can now design and implement
experiments using VR with relative ease and at reasonable costs.
In light of this, a supplementary motivation of this study was
to develop and demonstrate the viability of conducting cognitive
science research using consumer-grade VR technology.
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Investigating the Viability of Consumer VR
for Research
Despite the advantages and ease of creating virtual environments,
there are a variety of non-trivial sizing and positioning challenges
to achieve high congruency between the virtual and the real. A
good match means that virtual features such as chairs, tables,
hands, and viewing position are visually at the same scale,
position and orientation as corresponding real features. Failure
to carefully solve these challenges may introduce uncontrolled
spatial and sizing conflicts between visual and proprioceptive
feedback, which could impact experiment results and obscure
analysis of the specific cue manipulations we wished to perform.
In this study we therefore also aimed to demonstrate clear
methods for matching the real and virtual worlds using
consumer VR.
Summary of Aims and Hypotheses
To summarize, in this study we investigate three distinct
components of self-representation—embodiment, agency and
presence—within a single experimental context. Our first aim
was to systematically investigate how FORM, TOUCH, and
OFFSET influence these components of self-representation. To
measure changes in self-representation we employed rating
scales and items that have previously been used in embodiment
(Longo et al., 2008b), agency (Polito et al., 2013), and presence
(Sanchez-Vives and Slater, 2005) research. Our second aim was
to demonstrate that scientific research on self-representation can
be conducted successfully using consumer-grade VR technology.
We formulated five specific hypotheses concerning the
influence of FORM, TOUCH, and OFFSET cues on self-
representation. First, based on previous work (Tsakiris and
Haggard, 2005; Tsakiris et al., 2010), we predicted that using
an incongruent FORM in our VHI paradigm would negatively
impact embodiment ratings compared to the congruent FORM.
Second, we predicted that changes in TOUCH would influence
embodiment measures for both plausible visual forms (i.e.,
hands), and for implausible visual forms (i.e., simple geometric
volumes that are not hand-shaped, see Ma and Hommel, 2015).
In other words, we expected a main effect of TOUCH but no
interaction of TOUCH and FORM. Third, based on previous
findings (Zopf et al., 2010; Preston, 2013), we expected that spatial
OFFSET would not have a strong overall effect on embodiment.
Fourth, based on earlier work showing an increased effect of
TOUCH on embodiment when a rubber hand is displaced from
a participant’s actual hand (Zopf et al., 2010), we predicted
that TOUCH would be most important when there is a spatial
discrepancy between vision and proprioception. That is, we
expected an interaction between TOUCH and OFFSET. Our fifth
hypothesis concerned the sense of agency. We expected that
the occurrence of touch would influence sense of agency since
tactile signals indicate that an action is occurring in the external
environment, such as contacting a surface while reaching for an
object. As agency is robust to noisy sensory signals (Moore and
Fletcher, 2012), we specifically expected that the mere occurrence
of tactile feedback, rather than visual-tactile synchrony per se,
would influence agency ratings. Since FORM and OFFSET cues
do not provide obvious indications of action, we did not expect
these manipulations to influence sense of agency ratings. We did
not have strong predictions regarding presence, as the effect of




We tested 50 participants who either received course credit
for participation or payment of $15. Twenty-five participants
(16 female, 21 right handed, mean age 21 years, range 18–34
years) completed the experiment with a zero spatial OFFSET
condition and 25 participants (14 female, 25 right-handed, mean
age 20 years, range 18–32 years) completed the experiment
with a non-zero spatial OFFSET condition. This research was
conducted in accordance with the ethical standards laid down
in the 1964 Declaration of Helsinki and was approved by
the Macquarie University Ethics Review Committee (Human
Research). Informed consent was obtained from all participants.
Equipment
The primary device for delivery of all VR experiments was the
Oculus Rift Development Kit 21 (DK2), depicted in Figure 1A.
The DK2 is a HMD with positional camera tracking system that
allows six degrees of freedom head tracking (head rotation and
translation). We chose PC hardware sufficient to maintain the
visual frame rate at the maximum DK2 display refresh rate of
75 Hz at the native DK2 display resolution (960∗1080 pixels per
eye), with no transient drops in frame rate, frame skipping, or
latency spikes. Full specifications for the DK2 and PC hardware
are included in Appendices A and B in Supplementary Material.
Tactile stimuli were delivered via a vibrating tactor device
placed beneath the participant’s index finger. Tactor oscillations
were driven via 200Hz sinewave audio outputs from the PC’s
audio processing card. Technical details for the tactor and PC
audio processing are provided in Appendix B in Supplementary
Material.
3D Environment and Software
We used the Unity2 3D videogame engine, version 5.1.2f1 (64-
bit) software to construct the 3D environment. The environment
was a simple monochrome space with no complex graphical
textures (see Figures 1B,C). The virtual space resembled the
actual lab environment and consisted of gray floor, desk, chair,
and a virtual computer screen that were illuminated via a virtual
light source from above. There were no walls and illumination
faded to black if the participant looked into the distance.
Our experiment maintained dynamic illumination which has
been shown to increase the plausibility of the VR experience
(Khanna et al., 2006; Slater et al., 2009a; Yu et al., 2012) and is
readily achievable with the Unity 5 engine (including soft-edged
shadows and real-time light from the flashing virtual button
1http://www.oculus.com/en-us/dk2/.
2http://unity3d.com/. Unity 3D allows a number of options for writing supporting
programming code. For these experiments we used the C# programming language,
which is widely used within the Unity3D user community.
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FIGURE 1 | (A) Experimental setup, with the tactor positioned beneath the
right index finger. The monitor offers a 2D depiction of the participant’s view for
the experimenter to observe. (B) An overhead view of the entire virtual
environment (i.e., not from the participant’s viewpoint). (C) Virtual hand/finger
placement, also depicting the visual feedback corresponding to a touch.
Dynamic illumination effects such as the light flash reflection from the hand and
table are visible. (D) A close up of the virtual button in the “no touch” condition
with the incongruent FORM (a sphere).
cast onto nearby objects such as the hand, table and virtual
monitor). Virtual objects used in the scene, including furniture
and the hand model, were either created directly within Unity
(simple geometric solids) or acquired at no cost online. We used
a consistent, gender neutral arm model for all participants3.
Calibrating the Virtual Environment
To ensure that the apparent size and position of virtual
objects matched the real environment, and to also calibrate the
participant’s virtual viewpoint to their real-world viewpoint, we
adopted the following procedures.
Similar Plain Appearance for Real and Virtual Objects
We measured the dimensions and placement of real-world
objects involved in the experiment, and kept the general
appearance of the real desk and walls unadorned and featureless.
These object dimensions and similarly plain appearance were
reproduced in the virtual environment.
Benchmarking Virtual Space and Size
Aligning the virtual and real environments involved calibration
along two separate factors. First, units of distance in the virtual
environment were benchmarked against real distances in the
physical workspace environment to ensure a close match. We
assessed this by moving the HMD 50 cm along the desk within
view of the position-tracking camera, and noting the real-
time movement of the corresponding viewpoint in the virtual
environment. After repeated testing, we established that (at
3The hand model was obtained from the Leap Motion Unity core assets package,
available at: http://developer.leapmotion.com/unity.
least for our setup) 100 cm in the real workspace environment
corresponded to 0.96 distance units in Unity. This ratio was used
in creating and positioning virtual objects (e.g., the desk and
chair) to achieve close alignment between the physical and virtual
environments.
Calibrating Scaling for Each Participant
In VR, depth perception is achieved via binocular stereopsis
by presenting an offset camera view to each eye. The distance
between these two virtual cameras is directly correlated to
what the participant perceives as their own size in the virtual
environment, and therefore affects the participant’s sense of the
relative scale of all virtual objects and distances. So that each
participant perceived the virtual world with the same sense of
scale as they do in the real world, we measured the distance
between each participant’s pupils (inter-pupillary distance or
IPD), and set a corresponding separation between the virtual
camera view for each eye. This separation is readily manipulated
by entering the participant’s IPD directly into the Oculus Rift
DK2 configuration utility4.
IPD was initially measured using a utility provided with
the Oculus runtime. However, this procedure proved time
consuming and occasionally produced obviously incorrect
measurements, and was abandoned after 18 participants. For the
remaining participants, we instead measured IPD using a ruler
positioned against the participant’s nose. When compared over
several tests the two measurement techniques were within ±2
mm of one another.
Positioning the Virtual Viewpoint to Match the
Real-World Viewpoint
We used a small, custom-made HMD mount to locate the HMD
in a preset real-world position and orientation prior to each
experiment, within view of the positional-tracking camera. Once
the HMD’s real-world position/orientation were fixed by placing
it in themount, the experimenter could shift the virtual viewpoint
to align with the HMD’s real world position/orientation with a
single key press. Following this, the HMD could then be moved
around and placed on the participant’s head. The positional-
tracking camera would maintain an accurate record of its real-
world location, and adjust the virtual viewpoint accordingly
in real time to maintain alignment with the participant’s head
movements. This calibration step was repeated after every
experiment trial. The HMD mount was removed from the setup
while running the experiment trial itself.
Appropriately Situating the Participant’s Real Hand
As described below, the experiment design required appropriate
positioning and posture of the participant’s real right hand
to enable a match or mismatch (depending on the OFFSET
condition) between the proprioceptive feedback from the real
hand and visual feedback from the virtual hand. The location
4Note: the configuration utility was available for the Oculus DK2 and in the
developmental Oculus runtime version 0.6.0.1 as used in our experiments.
However, in the commercial release of the Oculus Rift and runtime, this
configuration utility is no longer available. IPD adjustments for the commercial
release are now made with a slider control on the underside of the commercial
release Oculus Rift HMD.
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of the participant’s real hand and index finger were controlled
by adhering the tactor to specific physical locations on the desk
for each of the OFFSET conditions and instructing participants
to place the tip of their index finger on the tactor. Participants
were also instructed to align their real hand posture to that of the
virtual hand for trials involving the hand FORM condition.
Multisensory Touch Stimulation in VR
Visual–tactile feedback to the participant consisted of a
periodic vibration delivered by a tactor positioned beneath the
participant’s right index finger. Participants wore headphones to
mute both the audible noise resulting from the vibration of the
tactor unit, and any other unwanted environmental noise.
Self-Representation Rating Scales
To measure embodiment, agency, and presence, we employed
three sets of rating scales.
Embodiment Rating Scales (Botvinick and Cohen,
1998; Longo et al., 2008b)
We used the 10 embodiment rating scale items from Longo
et al. (2008b) as well as the item “It seemed like I was feeling
the touch in the location where I saw the rubber hand being
touched,” which is often included in RHI studies and positively
rated in synchronous conditions (Botvinick and Cohen, 1998).
As the viewed stimulus varied across trials in this task (i.e., a
hand or a sphere), the wording of items in this questionnaire
was modified to refer to “the target.” Based on the findings of
Longo et al. we further divided these 11 items into three different
subcomponents (see Table 1 for details): embodiment–ownership
(for example, “It seemed like the target belonged to me”),
embodiment–location (for example, “It seemed like the target
was in the location where my hand was”), and embodiment–
agency (“It seemed like I was in control of the target”). For each
item participants rated their level of agreement on a 7-point
Likert scale from “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree.” In the
“no touch” condition, the items referring to touch experience (8
and 9) were not presented. We computed average embodiment
component scores for ownership, location and agency for each
participant and condition.
The Sense of Agency Rating Scale (SOARS; Polito
et al., 2013)
The SOARS is a 10-item scale that measures subjective
alterations to the sense of agency related to some specific
experience. Participants were instructed to think of the preceding
experimental task and to rate their level of agreement with a series
of statements on a 7-point Likert scale from “strongly disagree”
to “strongly agree.” The scale has two factors: (1) involuntariness,
with items such as “I felt that my experiences and actions were
not caused by me,” which represent a subjectively-experienced
reduction in control over one’s own actions; and (2) effortlessness,
with items such as “My experiences and actions occurred
effortlessly,” which represent a subjectively-experienced increase
in the ease and automaticity with which actions occur. Although,
the SOARS was originally developed for use in hypnosis, we
used a modified, general form with slight edits to the wording of
TABLE 1 | Embodiment rating scale (Based on Longo et al., 2008b).
Item Subscale
1. It seemed like I was looking directly at my own hand
rather than the target
Ownership
2. It seemed like the target began to resemble my real hand Ownership
3. It seemed like the target belonged to me Ownership
4. It seemed like the target was my hand Ownership
5. It seemed like the target was part of my body Ownership
6. It seemed like my hand was in the location where the
target was
Location
7. It seemed like the target was in the location where my
hand was
Location
8.* It seemed like the touch I felt was caused by the button
flash at the target
Location
9.* It seemed like I was feeling the touch in the location
where I saw the target being touched
Location
10. It seemed like I could have moved the target if I had
wanted.
Agency
11. It seemed like I was in control of the target Agency
*These items not included in “no-touch” conditions.
three items (#1, #4, and #10), which is applicable in any context
(Table 2).
Presence Rating Items (Sanchez-Vives and Slater,
2005)
Participants rated three presence items on a 7-point Likert scale:
(1) “To what extent did you have a sense of being in the virtual
environment,” rated from “not at all” to “very much so”; (2) “To
what extent were there times during the experience when the
virtual environment became “reality” for you, and you almost
forgot about the “real world” of the laboratory in which the
whole experience was really taking place?,” rated from “never”
to “almost all the time”; and (3) “When you think back to your
experience, do you think of the virtual environment more as
images that you saw, or more as somewhere that you visited?,”
rated from “only images that I saw” to “somewhere that I visited.”
These items are reported by Sanchez-Vives and Slater (2005)
as representative items for assessing alterations in presence.
Although the descriptive poles of the Likert scale differ across
items, in all cases a score of 1 represents no presence, whereas
a score of 7 represents complete presence.
Experimental Design
The experiment included FORM, TOUCH, and OFFSET
manipulations. We implemented two within-subject FORM
conditions (see Figures 1C,D): (a) a congruent feedback
condition involving the presentation of a realistically depicted
virtual hand and forearm shape, in which the index finger was
positioned on top of a realistically depicted virtual tactor on a
virtual table. The virtual hand had smooth, unmarked texturing
and light gray coloring; and (b) an incongruent hand feedback
condition involving the presentation of a smooth, unmarked gray
spherical object (∼1.8 cm in apparent diameter), appearing atop
the virtual tactor (Figure 1D) in the same position as the tip
of the participant’s real index finger. The virtual tactor could
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TABLE 2 | General form of the Sense of Agency Rating Scale (Polito et al.,
2013).
Item Subscale
1.* Doing what I was meant to was hard Effortlessness
2.* I chose how to respond Involuntariness
3.* My experiences and actions felt self-generated Involuntariness
4. I went along with my experiences freely Effortlessness
5.* My experiences and actions were under my control Involuntariness
6. I felt that my experiences and actions were not
caused by me
Involuntariness
7. My experiences and actions occurred effortlessly Effortlessness
8. I was mostly absorbed in what was going on Effortlessness
9. My responses were involuntarily Involuntariness
10.* I was reluctant to go along with my experiences Effortlessness
*These items are reverse scored.
be presented in one of two states: either visually vibrating and
glowing bright red (an ON state corresponding to the delivery
of tactile feedback) or completely motionless with a dull dark
red color (an OFF state corresponding to the absence of tactile
feedback).
For TOUCH manipulations, there were three within-subject
conditions: (a) synchronous touch—visual and tactile stimulation
were initiated at the same time and presented for 300ms every
1000ms; (b) asynchronous touch—the tactile stimulation was
identical to the synchronous case, while the visual flash/vibration
was initiated at random intervals between 500 and 1500ms
after the tactile feedback; and (c) no touch—no visual or tactile
vibration stimulation was given.
Although they were initiated simultaneously in code, we
tested the system delay timing using a 240 frames/second audio-
visual camera. We recorded onset of visual feedback through
the HMD lenses and onset of tactor vibrations by increasing
vibration amplitude sufficiently to produce an audible sound
that could be recorded by the camera’s microphone. In analysing
25 recorded tactor vibrations, we found that there was a mean
delay of 226ms (SD 13ms) between the visual flash and the
tactor vibration. This delay meant that the visual and tactile
stimulation was not completely synchronous in the synchronous
condition. However, small delays due to human error would
also be expected in research employing manual brush stroking.
Previous RHI research found no difference between delays as
long as 300ms compared to smaller delays for inducing changes
in embodiment (Shimada et al., 2009). In addition, the low
variability in delay magnitude from vibration to vibration means
that better consistency for this experiment is likely than for RHI
research employing manual brush stroking.
Finally, we had two between-subjects OFFSET conditions: (1)
0 cm spatial offset, with the participant’s real hand positioned
along the body midline, in the same apparent position as the
virtual hand, and (2) 30 cm offset, with the participant’s real right
hand positioned 30 cm to the right of the body midline, while
the virtual hand (or sphere) position was maintained in the exact
position and orientation as in the 0 cm offset condition. OFFSET
was investigated as a between subject condition partly to keep the
experiment duration reasonable (a third within-subject condition
would double the experiment duration), but also to minimize
the potential for leading the participant: for FORM and TOUCH
manipulations, participants can receive identical instructions and
experiment setup is unchanged. Changing the OFFSET condition
requires moving the placement of the tactor on the desk and
moving the participant’s hand. This may have signaled a change
to the participant and influenced their responses.
Each participant was tested in one of these two OFFSET
conditions and completed all FORM and TOUCH conditions in
a 2-by-3 factorial design—six trials per participant. There are 720
possible orderings of the six conditions. Since we only used 25
orderings, we adopted a pseudo-random ordering selection for
each participant. This involved randomly selecting an order from
the 720 possible orderings for a participant, and then using the
reverse of this for the next participant. The same orderings were
used for the 25 participants tested with the 0 cm offset condition
as for the 25 participants tested with the 30 cm offset condition.
Procedure
Following IPD measurement and positional calibration, the
participant was seated and the HMD placed on the participant’s
head.We ensured that the positional tracking camera did not lose
view of the HMD while this was done, to maintain the virtual-
to real-environment match. The experimenter then assisted the
participant in adjusting their real chair so that they were sitting
with their torso a few centimeters from the edge of the desk,
and central to the scene. In discussion with the participant,
the experimenter fitted the straps and HMD position to ensure
optimal focus. Participants were asked to adjust the HMD on
their heads until they had good focus in the center of their vision.
Participants were instructed to keep their left arm in their lap
where it would be obscured from view by the desk (this ensured
consistency with the virtual environment where no left arm was
visible), to sit up straight, and avoid leaning back or rotating the
chair position. Participants were otherwise free to look around
the scene or to lean in to view objects in the scene more closely.
Participants began each trial viewing the desk scene without
any local tactile stimulus, with instructions displayed on the
virtual monitor. While viewing this scene, the experimenter
would ensure the participant was correctly positioned and also
place headphones on the participant. At the commencement of
each of the six experiment trials, the participant would first see
15 s of darkness, before again viewing the same desk scene for
the experiment trial proper. Participants would view the target
and experience visual–tactile stimulation (or not, in the case of
the “no touch” trials) for a 1-min duration. During this time,
participants were instructed to keep their arm still, but were free
to move their head as desired to view the target from any angle.
Following each trial, participants were prompted to remove the
HMD and complete a questionnaire.
At the beginning of responding to the set of rating items
the participant was told that the target referred to either the
“gray hand” or the “gray sphere” as appropriate. In order to
minimize stereotyped responses, the embodiment, agency, and
presence rating item sets were presented in random order.
Furthermore, the order of items within each set was randomized.
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The ratings were presented using Qualtrics Survey Software
(www.qualtrics.com) on a separate laptop.
Positional calibration using the HMD mount was performed
at the start of each experiment trial. Each of the six variations was
prepared in separate executable files. The experiment duration,
including IPD measurement, instructions, and the six trials, was
typically 30–45 min.
RESULTS
To investigate the effects of FORM, TOUCH, and OFFSET,
we entered all rating scale means (embodiment–ownership,
embodiment–location, embodiment–agency, presence,
involuntariness, effortlessness) into a multivariate analysis of
variance (MANOVA) with the within-subject factors FORM
(hand, sphere) and TOUCH (synchronous, asynchronous, no
touch stimulation), and the between-subject factor OFFSET (0
cm spatial offset, 30 cm spatial offset). To further investigate
the effect of different cues on each self-representation scale
separately, we conducted individual ANOVAs with the factors
FORM, TOUCH, and OFFSET. We found non-normal rating
response distributions for some rating scales (Shapiro–Wilk-
tests). However, ANOVA are robust also for non-normally
distributed data when the sample size is equal (Field, 2009).
For FORM, there was a multivariate main effect across all
rating scales [Pillai’s trace, V = 0.756, F(6, 43) = 22.25, p <
0.001, ηp
2
= 0.756]. ANOVA for each rating scale separately
showed that viewing a hand resulted in significantly higher
mean values compared to viewing a sphere for embodiment–
ownership, embodiment–agency, embodiment–location, presence
and effortlessness, but not involuntariness (see Table 3 for
statistics and Figures 2–4).
We found a multivariate main effect of TOUCH [Pillai’s trace,
V = 0.448, F(6, 43) = 2.50, p = 0.016, ηp
2
= 0.448]. ANOVA
for each variable separately showed that TOUCH was significant
for embodiment–ownership, embodiment–agency, embodiment–
location, presence, and involuntariness. We found a trend for
effortlessness (Table 3). We also used planned, simple contrasts
to directly compare the effect of synchronous and asynchronous
touch (effect of touch synchrony) as well as between synchronous
and asynchronous touch combined and compared to no touch
(effect of touch occurrence). We found a significant effect of
touch synchrony for embodiment–location and presence, such
that synchronous touch led to higher self-representation ratings
[embodiment–location: F(1, 48) = 8.03, p < 0.001, ηp
2
= 0.269;
presence: F(1, 48) = 8.88, p = 0.005, ηp
2
= 0.156]. Surprisingly,
there was only a trend for embodiment–ownership [F(1, 48) =
3.93, p = 0.053, ηp
2
= 0.076]. There was no effect of touch
TABLE 3 | Statistics (F and p-values and effect sizes) for Multivariate and Univariate Main effects for FORM, TOUCH, and OFFSET.
FORM TOUCH OFFSET
F P ηp
2 F p ηp
2 F p ηp
2
Multivariate 22.25 <0.001 0.756 2.50 0.016 0.448 6.01 <0.001 0.456
Ownership 142.17 <0.001 0.748 8.28 <0.001 0.147 2.76 0.103 0.054
Location 44.70 <0.001 0.482 8.37 <0.001 0.148 28.77 <0.001 0.375
Agency 34.60 <0.001 0.419 5.19 0.007 0.098 0.26 0.615 0.005
Involuntariness 0.60 0.443 0.012 3.79 0.026 0.073 2.86 0.097 0.056
Effortlessness 5.24 0.027 0.098 2.79 0.066 0.055 0.65 0.425 0.013
Presence 29.81 <0.001 0.383 9.81 <0.001 0.170 2.85 0.098 0.056
Bold text indicates a significant result.
FIGURE 2 | Embodiment mean rating scale results. For each subscale, TOUCH conditions (Synchronous, Asynchronous, No Touch) are depicted for all FORM
and OFFSET conditions: (A) No Offset—Hand; (B) Offset—Hand; (C) No Offset—Sphere; and (D) Offset—Sphere. Error bars present the standard error of the mean.
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FIGURE 3 | Agency mean rating scale results. For each subscale, TOUCH conditions (Synchronous, Asynchronous, No Touch) are depicted for all FORM and
OFFSET conditions: (A) No Offset—Hand; (B) Offset—Hand; (C) No Offset—Sphere; and (D) Offset—Sphere. Error bars present the standard error of the mean.
synchrony for any of the agency measures [embodiment–agency:
F(1, 48) = 2.07, p = 0.156, ηp
2
= 0.041, involuntariness:
F(1, 48) = 0.802, p = 0.375, ηp
2
= 0.016, effortlessness: F(1, 48)
= 0.802, p = 0.375, ηp
2
= 0.016]. In contrast, we found a
significant effect of touch occurrence for all scales [embodiment–
ownership: F(1, 48) = 10.71, p= 0.002, ηp
2
= 0.182, embodiment–
agency: F(1, 48) = 7.64, p = 0.008, ηp
2
= 0.137, embodiment–
location: F(1, 48) = 4.71, p = 0.035, ηp
2
= 0.089, involuntariness:
F(1, 48) = 4.06, p = 0.050, ηp
2
= 0.078, effortlessness: F(1, 48)
= 6.67, p = 0.013, ηp
2
= 0.122, and presence: F(1, 48) =
10.31, p = 0.002, ηp
2
= 0.177], such that each of these ratings
were higher for touch compared to no-touch conditions. To
summarize, for embodiment–ownership, embodiment–location,
and presence, touch synchrony, and touch occurrence were both
significant factors. In contrast, agency measures (embodiment–
agency, effortlessness, and involuntariness) were sensitive only to
touch occurrence (a trend only for involuntariness). We found no
significantmultivariate or univariate interactions between FORM
and TOUCH, or between TOUCH and OFFSET (Table 4). This
indicates that the effect of TOUCH does not differ for hand
and sphere forms, or when the virtual hand location is displaced
relative to the actual hand.
For OFFSET, we found amultivariatemain effect [Pillai’s trace,
V = 0.456, F(6, 43) = 6.01, p < 0.001, ηp
2
= 0.456]. Individual
ANOVAs revealed an unsurprising main effect of embodiment–
location, such that participants gave higher ratings in the no
spatial offset condition compared to the spatial offset condition.
No significant OFFSET effect was found for any of the other
scales (Table 4).
Furthermore, there was a multivariate interaction of FORM-
by-OFFSET, indicating that the overall effect of FORM on
our measures of self-representation depended on whether the
FIGURE 4 | Presence mean rating scale results. For each subscale,
TOUCH conditions (Synchronous, Asynchronous, No Touch) are depicted for
all FORM and OFFSET conditions: (A) No Offset—Hand; (B) Offset—Hand;
(C) No Offset—Sphere; and (D) Offset—Sphere. Error bars present the
standard error of the mean.
apparent location of the virtual hand was displaced from the
location of the actual hand [Pillai’s trace, V = 0.337, F(6, 43) =
3.64, p = 0.005, ηp
2
= 0.337]. Univariate ANOVAs for each
rating scale separately showed this interaction to be significant
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TABLE 4 | Statistics (F and p-values and effect sizes) for Multivariate and Univariate Interaction effects for FORM, TOUCH, and OFFSET.
FORM × TOUCH FORM × OFFSET TOUCH × OFFSET FORM × TOUCH × OFFSET
F p ηp
2 F p ηp
2 F p ηp
2 F p ηp
2
Multivariate 1.21 0.311 0.282 3.64 0.005 0.337 1.92 0.063 0.384 0.47 0.920 0.132
Ownership 1.57 0.214 0.032 1.78 0.188 0.036 0.01 0.994 0 1.32 0.273 0.027
Location 2.13 0.124 0.043 5.89 0.019 0.109 1.67 0.194 0.034 0.83 0.441 0.017
Agency 0.37 0.692 0.008 1.27 0.265 0.026 1.27 0.287 0.026 0.65 0.527 0.013
Involuntariness 1.07 0.349 0.022 0.10 0.757 0.002 0.64 0.533 0.013 0.55 0.581 0.011
Effortlessness 0.05 0.950 0.001 0.11 0.745 0.002 0.24 0.786 0.005 0.93 0.399 0.019
Presence 2.08 0.131 0.042 3.27 0.077 0.064 0.77 0.466 0.016 0.12 0.890 0.002
Bold text indicates a significant result.
for embodiment–location only (see Table 4 for statistics). As
can be seen in Figure 2 (“Embodiment Location” panel), the
difference between viewing a hand and viewing a sphere was
relatively small in the no spatial offset condition, whereas a
change in FORM had a much greater effect when there was a
spatial offset. Viewing a sphere in the spatial offset condition led
to negative embodiment–location scores, whereas embodiment–
location ratings were positive when viewing a hand, regardless of
OFFSET. We did not find a FORM-by-OFFSET interaction for
any of the other variables (Table 4).
There was no multivariate or univariate 3-way interaction of
FORM, TOUCH, and OFFSET (Table 4).
DISCUSSION
This study utilized a novel consumer grade VR system to
test the impacts of FORM, TOUCH and OFFSET on self-
representation in a Virtual Hand Illusion paradigm. We used
multiple measures including an embodiment scale commonly
used in RHI studies (Longo et al., 2008b); the Sense of Agency
Rating Scale (SOARS), which has previously been used to assess
alterations to feelings of agency in studies of self-generated
actions in hypnotic and clinical contexts (Polito et al., 2013,
2014, 2015); and rating scale items for presence typically
used in studies of VR experiences (Sanchez-Vives and Slater,
2005). We found multivariate effects of FORM, TOUCH, and
OFFSET across all measures, confirming that each of these
cues has a broad influence on self-representation. We tested
five specific predictions about the effects of our experimental
manipulations.
Hypothesis One: The Effect of Form on
Embodiment
As expected, we found that a congruent visual representation
of the hand led to higher scores on all embodiment subscales
compared to the incongruent spherical cursor representation.
Previous studies have shown that FORM congruency is an
important factor in the traditional RHI setup (Tsakiris and
Haggard, 2005; Tsakiris et al., 2010), and these results also
confirm this for the VHI. The FORM resemblance of visual body
representations thus seems an important driver of embodiment.
Hypothesis Two: The Effect of Touch on
Embodiment
In line with our expectations the type of touch influenced all
embodiment subscales. This was not modulated by the FORM
of the target. This is consistent with findings from a recent
study by Ma and Hommel (2015), in which artificial objects on
a screen changed either synchronously or asynchronously with
the participant’s hand movements. Those authors found that
movement feedback synchrony modulated embodiment ratings
even for non-body objects. Here, we extend this finding and
report that FORMdoes not seem to significantly limit the effect of
touch synchrony, even with a static target. We found no evidence
that the effect of multimodal synchrony on self-representation is
limited or constrained by FORM (Tsakiris, 2010; Blanke et al.,
2015).
Hypothesis Three: The Effect of Offset on
Embodiment
We hypothesized that OFFSET would not influence embodiment
measures in this setup. Although we did find an effect of OFFSET
on embodiment–location, the subscales of embodiment–
ownership, and embodiment–agency were unaffected by
differences in OFFSET (0 vs. 30 cm). This suggests OFFSET is not
important for embodiment–ownership or embodiment–agency, at
least not when the artificial hand is viewed near the trunk and
the offset is within 45 cm (Zopf et al., 2010; Preston, 2013).
Hypothesis Four: The Interaction Effect of
Touch and Offset on Embodiment
Contrary to our expectations, the effect of TOUCH on
embodiment did not increase when we introduced a spatial
offset between participants viewed and actual hands. This
contrasted with earlier findings from our lab, which suggested
that increasing lateral distance might increase the influence of
TOUCH in the RHI (Zopf et al., 2010), although significant
interactions between TOUCH and OFFSET were also not
reported in that study. Our previous study employed an
even larger distance and compared a 45 cm offset with a
15 cm offset. It is possible that the effect of TOUCH is
greater for offsets beyond 30 cm. Taken together, these findings
indicate that TOUCH has a direct effect on embodiment
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independent of the FORM or OFFSET of the depicted hand
feedback.
Hypothesis Five: The Effect of Touch
Occurrence on Sense of Agency
As expected, contrasts between touch and no touch conditions
showed that touch occurrence contributed to significant higher
scores for all agency measures. Although, participants’ hands
remained still, tactile sensations appear to facilitate the
perception of action, and a sense of control over one’s actions in
the experiment. However, there was no effect of touch synchrony,
suggesting that when a touch does occur, agency measures are
insensitive to temporal delays.
The Effect of TOUCH, FORM, and OFFSET
on Presence
We had no strong predictions for the effect of different cues on
presence and this part of our study was explorative. We found a
significant impact of FORM and TOUCH, as well as both touch
occurrence and touch synchrony on presence. Furthermore, we
found non-significant trends for an OFFSET effect (p = 0.098)
as well as for an interaction between FORM and OFFSET (p =
0.077). This suggests that the experience of presence in our VR
setup is significantly modulated by the cues that also influence
embodiment. This implies in turn, that these cues influence the
experience of being situated in a virtual environment, in addition
to direct experience of one’s own body.
Complex Pattern of Influence of Cues on
Components of Self-Representation
Overall, univariate ANOVAs for each rating measure revealed
that FORM, TOUCH, and OFFSET influenced different
components of self-representation. FORM had a significant
impact on all embodiment subscales, effortlessness, and presence.
TOUCH had a significant influence on all embodiment subscales,
involuntariness and presence. OFFSET had a significant impact
on the embodiment–location subscale only. Furthermore, touch
occurrence had a significant impact on all rating scales, whereas
touch synchrony did not significantly impact any of the agency
scales
In line with previous work, we found no effect of OFFSET
on embodiment–ownership (Zopf et al., 2010; Kilteni et al.,
2012; Preston, 2013). However, we did find that the experience
of location for one’s own body was significantly affected by
OFFSET when directly comparing a no spatial offset with a
spatial offset condition. So in contrast to the other components
of self-experience, embodiment–location was sensitive to a
spatial difference between visual- and proprioceptive location
information in the virtual hand illusion. This supports the
idea that embodiment–ownership and embodiment–location
correspond to different self-components with different
mechanisms (Serino et al., 2013).
The pattern of results for presence ratings suggests that
presence tends to be influenced by similar cues as embodiment-
location ratings (although for OFFSET there were trends
for significance only). The current findings suggest that this
shift toward prioritizing virtual environment cues over real
environment cues is facilitated when there is a visual hand form,
multisensory touch signals, and no conflict between the perceived
spatial location of an individual’s virtual body and the actual
location of their real body.
For agency measures, we found an effect of touch occurrence.
However, these agency measures were not modulated by
touch synchrony. This accords with the previous finding that
visual-tactile synchrony affects different components of self-
representation such as ownership, location and agency differently
(Longo et al., 2008b; Kalckert and Ehrsson, 2012). However,
movement synchrony has previously been shown to affect
agency ratings (Kalckert and Ehrsson, 2012). Agency seems
sensitive to movement synchrony but not to touch synchrony
when the hand is passive. Additionally, agency scores were
not affected by OFFSET. Agency therefore seems robust to
both temporal and spatial multisensory discrepancies, whereas
the other self-representation components were not. This is
in line with research showing agency can be experienced for
spatially and temporally distant events (Faro et al., 2013).
However, agency was not immune to all sensory cues. FORM
significantly increased embodiment-agency as well as effortlessness
ratings, suggesting that participants were more likely to
experience agency for a target that was visually congruent with
their own body. Thus overall, visual information and FORM
congruency had a significant influence on all measures of self-
representation.
Not all agency rating scales were affected by FORM.We found
no significant effect on involuntariness. In this study we used
the SOARS, which conceptualizes sense of agency as comprising
two primary dimensions: involuntariness and effortlessness; and
also the embodiment-agency subscale, which conceptualizes
sense of agency as a subcomponent of embodiment. In earlier
work, Polito et al. (2013) showed that involuntariness and
effortlessness are quite distinct conceptual subcomponents of the
subjective sense of agency. It may be that effortlessness (and
also embodiment–agency) tap processes related to monitoring of
sensory signals, including visual cues; whereas involuntariness
taps more attributional judgments about agentive experience: for
example, tracking whether a movement actually occurred (there
were no actual self-generated movements in this task).
This componential view of agency is consistent with research
indicating that sense of agency is a multidimensional construct
that fluctuates in response to a range of sensory and cognitive
signals over time and across domains (Synofzik et al., 2008;
Gallagher, 2012; Polito et al., 2014). The current results
suggest that body-congruent visual cues may influence the
immediate, felt experience of agency (represented by higher
effortlessness scores), whereas the sensation of touch may
influence attributional judgments of agency (represented by
higher involuntariness scores).
To summarize, these findings highlight similarities and
differences between ownership, location, presence and the
three agency aspects embodiment–agency, effortlessness, and
involuntariness. Based on the findings here, there is some overlap
but also important differences between the influence of different
cues on these components.
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No Single Cue Strictly Constrains
Self-Representation in the VHI
The common link between the three cues we manipulated is that
they all involve comparing a condition where visual information
is in harmony with other bodily information, to a condition
where a discrepancy is introduced: whether a viewed body
form matches an actual body form; whether a viewed touch
corresponds to a felt touch, and whether a viewed hand position
matches the proprioceptively felt hand position. In all three cases,
a better match generally signals that the visual information is
more plausible and therefore more likely to be related to one’s
own body.
Previous accounts of body ownership and self-consciousness
proposed that specific cues can operate as strict hierarchical
constraints on the processing of subsequent cues (e.g., Tsakiris,
2010; Blanke et al., 2015). For example, one influential model
of body-ownership posits a hierarchical sequence of matching
stages in which successful matching at one stage permits
matching at the next stage, and unsuccessful matching gates or
constrains further processing stages (Tsakiris, 2010). According
to this account, in the first stage, current visual information
about form is matched with a stored model of the way the
body typically looks to eliminate gross mismatches. Only if
matching is successful in the first stage is a second stage of
more fine-grained comparisons performed between visual and
proprioceptive information about bodily posture and anatomical
position. Finally, only if a postural match is confirmed in the
second stage, does a third stage of comparisons commence in
which the temporal synchrony between viewed and felt touch
is analyzed. According to this model, because matching at each
stage is hypothesized to occur in a strict hierarchy, a form
mismatch, for example, will restrict or gate the sense of body
ownership even if other cue comparisons such as visual-tactile
synchrony suggest congruency. This model therefore predicts
specific interactions between the different cues involved in the
various comparison stages.
We found no evidence for strict hierarchical interactions.
Instead, we primarily observed main effects for different cues
on self-representation. This implies that whereas each of the
cues is important for self-representation, none hierarchically
constrains or limits the influence of any of the other
cues. Congruent information from all types of cue can, to
some extent, independently and non-hierarchically influence
self-representation. This finding indicates a flexible self-
representation system that can readily adapt to different
combinations of multisensory cues.
Implications for VR Methods
Overall, this study demonstrated that consumer-grade VR
equipment can be used in the lab to investigate cues that influence
self-representation. Studying self-representation in VR allows for
a high level of experimental control, continuity, and accurate
repeatability of stimulus presentation. We have successfully set
up a VR laboratory environment using less than AU$1000 in
VR hardware and software (not including PC equipment), that
allowed us to manipulate visual, tactile, and proprioceptive cues.
Equipment and software is readily available, with a number of
consumer VR HMD vendors entering the market in 2016.
We successfully demonstrated a calibration procedure for
appropriately registering the virtual environment as viewed by
each participant so that it aligned with the real environment. We
achieved this by measuring participant inter-pupillary distance,
determining the ratio between units of measurement in the
virtual environment and real world measurements, and by
appropriately sizing virtual objects to achieve a good match.
By correctly locating the HMD in real space, we can, with a
single keypress, move the virtual viewpoint to the corresponding
position. Good calibration is important for avoiding unwanted or
unmeasured experimental influences. Following calibration, the
built-in head position tracking of the VR system ensures that the
participant’s virtual viewpoint is thereafter constantly aligned to
their real head and view position. This procedure demonstrates
the simplicity with which consumer VR systems can be used for
research where a requirement is close calibration between real
and virtual environment features.
Our findings also have implications for human-computer
interface design and a variety of consumer VR applications.
VR software designers aim to create virtual worlds, games and
experiences that distinguish their software from conventional 2D
software. This means maximizing user experiences of presence,
embodiment, and agency over virtual avatars. Understanding
the relationships between specific sensory cues and users’
subjective self-representations can inform this intention, giving
developers more detailed information on the features and
controls important for achieving good design. There are five
findings from this study that may inform VR applications. First,
that both visual form congruency and touch synchrony are
generally important for compelling self-representation in VR.
Second, relative to those cues, a spatial discrepancy between
the proprioceptively felt real hand location and the visually
apparent virtual hand location is not a sensitive influence
on most elements of self-representation. Third, agency and
presence seem to depend on the same multisensory cues (FORM,
TOUCH, and OFFSET) that have been identified as important
in the embodiment literature. Fourth, touch stimuli can be
used in different ways: synchronous touch influences feelings
of embodiment and presence, whereas the simple occurrence of
touch may be sufficient to influence a sense of agency. Fifth,
cues differ in their relevance for different components of self-
experience in VR. So, depending on what self-experience is
important for a specific VR implementation or product (e.g.,
ownership vs. agency), the designer may focus on different cues.
Furthermore, these results can inform the design of VR software
for therapeutical settings, where modulating the intensity of self-
representation with different cues (e.g., employing graduated
exposure treatments in anxiety disorders) could be important.
Limitations
An important innovation of our study was that we investigated
the influence of a set of cues on a set of components thought
to be important for self-representation. To do this we employed
rating scales. Rating scales require participants to make explicit
judgment responses and these may be subject to responses biases.
For example, participants may have responded to different rating
scales in a similar manner or responded to the repetition of the
questionnaires similarly. We tried to provide a safe-guard for
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repetitive response patterns by randomizing the rating scales.
That we found different patterns for different rating scales
suggests that we did tap into differences in self-representation
that were not simply due to the way participants tended to
respond to these items. In future research, converging evidence
from implicit measures will be useful to further investigate the
mechanisms that support the representation of one’s own body
and actions.
For presence we only employed a small set of ratings
(Sanchez-Vives and Slater, 2005). In future studies a full presence
rating scale measure could be used (e.g., Lessiter et al., 2001;
but see Slater et al., 2009b, for a critique of questionnaires
for measuring presence, and suggested alternatives such as
physiological measures).
In this study we manipulated a combination of visual, tactile
and proprioceptive cues while the body was static. However, in
many real-world scenarios as well as VR-applications the body
is moving. Additional cues related to initiating a movement
and processing movement feedback are likely crucial for self-
representation, particularly for agency. To further study these
cues and interactions with FORM, TOUCH, and OFFSET on
several aspects of self-representation, an active Virtual Hand
Illusion paradigm could be implemented.
Lastly, in our experimental design there is room for
improvement in achieving synchrony between visual and tactile
feedback relating to the experience of a touch. Since the system
delay from the onset of visual feedback to onset of the tactor
vibration is so steady, hardware based delays could be overcome
by hard-coding a countering delay for the visual feedback, such
that delay between the two is extinguished.
CONCLUSION
Our findings shed light on the multivariate influence of
visual form congruency (whether the virtual hand appears
similar in form to the participant’s real hand), touch
synchrony (whether virtual visual feedback about touch
is temporally synchronized with physically experienced
sensations of touch) and hand position alignment (whether
or not visual and proprioceptive feedback about hand
position are in agreement) on participants’ experiences of
embodiment, presence and sense of agency. We provided
evidence that each type of cue can independently influence
self-representation, but that none of these cues strictly
constrains or gates the influence of the others. We also
demonstrated that consumer-grade VR equipment can be used
successfully in the cognitive and brain sciences to investigate
self-representation.
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